According to an article from New York TimesIsraeli intelligence had obtained a Hamas Battle Plan for the October 7 attack more than a year before the attack, but he had neglected it because he believed the radical group was incapable of carrying out such a complex and massive military operation.
The battle plan is a document of around forty pages that the Israeli authorities called “Walls of Jericho”, named after a biblical episode and which describes very precisely the attack as it actually occurred on October 7: massive launch of rockets and missiles from the Gaza Strip to distract the Israeli army, use of drones to neutralize the security forces present on the border fence with Israel, then the entry into Israeli territory of hundreds of militiamen, some of whom allegedly used motorized paragliders, which actually happened.
The plan also included fairly detailed information on the location and strength of Israeli military positions on the border as well as various other information that theoretically would have been secret, which had long given rise to speculation that Hamas had succeeded in one way or another to obtain classified military information.
It is not clear how Israeli intelligence obtained the Hamas war plan, but it is known that the document circulated quite widely among intelligence agencies and was evaluated and then neglected. Israeli intelligence was convinced that a plan like the one described in “Walls of Jericho” was too ambitious for Hamas’ military capabilities, and that the group also had a political interest in strengthening itself inside the Gaza Strip instead. than to attack its external base. Intelligence officials admitted that Hamas would at some point attempt to carry out a large-scale attack on Israeli territory, but believed that this was an extremely remote option and one that the group was not comfortable with. yet prepared.
THE New York Times also obtained confidential emails that show there was a debate: an intelligence analyst pointed out at one point that Hamas was actually conducting military training consistent with the maneuvers outlined in the plan, but a colonel in the Hamas division the Israeli army in charge of the Gaza region had downplayed its concerns.
On October 7, when the attack took place, Israeli intelligence and security services were completely unprepared, and this is one of the main reasons for Hamas’s successful massacre of Israeli civilians. Some intelligence officials heard New York Times they admitted that if the plan had been taken more seriously, the attack could have been countered more effectively, or even prevented.
The question of Hamas’ attack plan is part of a series of errors and misjudgments by Israeli intelligence and security forces, whose leaders have already publicly apologized for not being able to defend the village. In recent weeks, there have also been many debates about political responsibilities, because for years the government had directed the army and security forces towards other objectives (such as defending settlers in the West Bank), leaving the region around the defenseless Gaza Strip. Gaza.
However, it is also necessary to place documents such as the “Walls of Jericho” in context, as plans, warnings and reports on the intentions and activities of groups like Hamas could be quite common within intelligence services. Israelis: always New York Times cites a 2016 document in which the Defense Ministry wrote that “Hamas intends to move the next confrontation to Israeli territory” and “occupy one Israeli population center, and perhaps several.”